INTRODUCTION
Judicial reasons often include general statements about the nature and behaviour of people and institutions 1 and the nature of the world and society. These statements Malbon refers to unarticulated 'judicial values' as the 'dark matter of judgments'. They form a critical part of the substance of the law, yet 'they can not be seen or clearly defined'. See
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High Court and Social Facts
319 ____________________________________________________________________________________ SF find their way into judicial reasoning in a range of ways. SF may be the subject of expert evidence at trial, or may be admitted into evidence via evidential rules dealing with documentary and other special forms of evidence. 10 SF may be referred to in counsel's submissions or, rarely, in the High Court SF may source from the submissions of amicus curiae or interveners. 11 Often SF appear to source from a judge's own knowledge or from a judge's own research (stated or unstated). It is unclear what the legal basis is for a judge to refer to SF (whether sourced from empirical research or otherwise) when that material has not been proved in evidence at trial. There is an unresolved question as to whether the doctrine of judicial notice or its statutory equivalent s 144 of the Evidence Acts 12 apply only to adjudicative facts or can also apply to allow (or disallow) judicial use of SF not otherwise proved in evidence. 13 Judicial use of more controversial SF may clearly fall outside the common law doctrine of judicial notice and s 144, particularly given many SF are not 'notorious' or universally and widely accepted. 14 Justice Heydon has suggested some SF are, however, of the 'common knowledge' kind which form an inherent part of the judicial law making function and fall outside the rules of evidence. 15 The recent High Court decision of Aytugrul v R 16 appears to interpret s 144 of the Evidence Acts to restrict judicial use of empirical research in support of SF used in the determination of legal principles unless the material has been admitted into evidence at trial, or the material otherwise fulfils the strict requirements of s 144 and notice has been given to the parties. 17 The High Court held that published empirical research is not reasonably open to question', and is common knowledge in the relevant locality or generally, or is 'capable of verification by reference to a document' where the authority of the document cannot be reasonably questioned.
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Federal Law Review Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ regarding jury perceptions of DNA evidence could not be used to support a new legal principle in relation to exclusion of prejudicial evidence. 18 In that case the material was not introduced at trial via expert evidence, but rather was introduced in the dissenting judgment of McClellan CJ in the NSW Court of Appeal and was referred to in appellant's submissions to the High Court. 19 The decision seems problematic in a number of respects. In particular it is still unclear whether there are any restrictions on judicial use of 'common sense' SF which are not based on any identified empirical or other research. This may have the invidious effect of excluding high quality published sources of SF information, while allowing judicial use of low quality intuitive or 'common sense' SF. An interpretation of the doctrine of judicial notice and s 144 which is overly restrictive in relation to empirical material may simply encourage judges to refer to such material to assist their reasoning but fail to cite the material in judgments. 20 This difficult, unresolved issue regarding the legal basis for judicial use of SF is outside the scope of this article. Whatever the 'legal' position in relation to judicial use of SF, it is clear judges have not been completely (or perhaps even substantially) restrained in practice from referring to SF in their judgments.
The presence of SF statements in judicial reasoning in Australian cases 21 has been acknowledged and documented by a range of commentators including Burns, 22 Mullane, 23 
19
See discussion in Rathus, above n 13, 85-6. 20 Ibid 89.
21
The term 'case' in this article refers to the reported or unreported overall judgment of a court in a particular matter. 35 However, despite apparent judicial and scholarly acceptance that judges do sometimes refer to SF in their judicial reasoning, there has been little Australian empirical examination of this phenomenon. 36 This potentially important aspect of how judges reason in the High Court (and other courts) has remained mysterious.
This article will discuss a content analysis study of SF in negligence cases in the Australian High Court. 37 The study examined the role SF play in judicial reasoning, how frequently SF are referred to by judges, how SF are sourced by judges, and whether judicial reference to SF differs depending on the importance or significance of a case, the individual judges involved, and whether judgments are joint or single, in dissent or in the majority. Part 1 will outline the content analysis methodology used in the study. Part 2 discusses the role that SF play in judicial reasoning. Part 3 examines how frequently SF were used in the cases studied. Part 4 considers whether the frequency of SF differed depending on the importance or significance of a case. Part 5 focuses on the sources of SF. Part 6 discusses how frequently each of the individual High Court judges studied referred to SF and how those SF were sourced. Finally, Part 7 examines whether the frequency of SF in an individual judgment 38 differed depending on whether a judge was in a single judgment or joint judgment, and by whether a judge's reasons formed part of a dissent or majority decision in a case.
Overall this study confirms that judges in the Australian High Court do refer to SF in their judicial reasoning, despite apparent uncertainty regarding the legal basis for ' (1990) 1 Public Law Review 134. This is also discussed in Gageler , above n 13.
36
Mullane has examined the use of social facts in the Family Court. See Mullane, above n 2. I have previously examined the use of social facts in negligence cases in the High Court, in a preliminary stage of this study. See Burns, 'The Way the World Is' and 'The High Court and Social Facts' above n 22.
37
The study was restricted to High Court cases and did not examine trial or lower appellate court judgments or parties' oral and written submissions except by way of background in selected instances. The study was conducted within an interpretivist (rather than positivist) epistemological paradigm and utilised a social constructionist approach. A qualitative, rather than a quantitative, approach was taken to the content analysis. The study did not undertake complex statistical analysis or modelling of the data as a quantitative content analysis might have done. Rather, the frequency and sourcing of SF identified in the study will be reported by number and percentage where relevant.
38
The term 'judgment' is used to refer to each individual judicial judgment (single or joint) within an overall court decision on a case.
Federal Law Review
Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ judicial use of SF. SF play a range of roles in judicial reasoning in the Australian High Court including to predict future social, economic and behavioural consequences of legal rules, 39 as part of setting a context or background to judicial reasons, 40 and as a tool to evaluate adjudicative facts. 41 SF do not generally dominate the text of judicial reasoning. However, they do appear to have a significant role to play in certain complex and more important cases. Judges did not use SF in all cases in the same way. Judges referred to SF more in high significance cases and cases with multiple separate judgments. Judges also referred to SF more in single and dissenting judgments than in joint and majority judgments. Most SF referred to by judges were not sourced or referenced in any way. Most SF appeared to source from judicial 'common sense' with the potential dangers this brings to the accuracy and legitimacy of judicial reasoning. Where a source or reference for a SF was given by a judge it was usually to another reported or unreported case or some other legal source. Judicial reference to empirical research was very rare. There were overall commonalities in the way different judges used SF. For example, all judges mostly gave no reference for their SF statements, or referred to cases or legal sources. However, some differences between individual judges emerged with some variations in the frequency with which judges used SF in their judgments, and in the manner in which they sourced or referenced SF. Cases were categorised as 'negligence' cases if they were indexed under the relevant CLR index or AustLII case headnote headings as being about negligence or damages (where the relevant case was a negligence case) and dealt with an element of a negligence action. Cases were not categorised as about 'negligence' if they were indexed only under private international law and dealt with issues arising out of that area of law, were indexed under workers' compensation (where a common law issue did not also arise), only dealt with issues relating to statutory accident compensation schemes, only dealt with limitation of actions procedures or other purely procedural issues (eg, pleading rules or damages interest calculations), or only raised issues arising from the Trade Practices Act 1974 (Cth).
I CONTENT ANALYSIS METHODOLOGY
55
This period included two judicial retirements (Gaudron J and McHugh J) and two judicial appointments (Heydon J and Crennan J). However, Crennan J did not take part in any
High Court and Social Facts 325 ____________________________________________________________________________________ judgments during those years were studied. 56 These cases are listed in Appendix 1. This study was based on High Court negligence cases, rather than other cases, for a number of reasons. There is a longstanding debate about the use of policy in negligence cases and an apparent longstanding use of SF in negligence cases. 57 Despite this, there has been very little empirical study of SF in negligence cases. Negligence cases also make up a relatively significant proportion of the overall appeal judgments handed down by the High Court. In 2001-2005, negligence cases comprised 12.12% of the overall appeal judgments. 58 The apparent judicial use of SF in negligence cases also may potentially correlate with the reference by judges of the High Court to secondary source materials in their judgments. In his 1999 study, Smyth studied the citation patterns of secondary source material in High Court judgments published in the CLR in 1960, 1970, 1980, 1990 and 1996. 59 He found that in 1996 tort cases (including negligence cases) accounted for 13% of all cases where secondary material was cited by judges. 60 This was second only to constitutional cases, which accounted for 44% of citations in that year. 61 The High Court cases studied were coded as high significance, medium significance or low significance to allow an analysis of whether the frequency of judicial SF varied based on case complexity and importance. Given the absence of a similar study of the High Court, significance criteria were developed to reflect the complexity and importance of each case both from the perspective of the High Court itself and from the perspective of the legal profession and legal academy. 62 The 'significance' factors considered for each case in determining the significance coding of the case included _____________________________________________________________________________________ negligence judgments handed down in late 2005 following her appointment and is not included in the content analysis study. Given the retirement of Gaudron J early in the study period, the majority of judgments studied in the content analysis did not include any judgments by a female judge. The time period chosen was also one during which the state of negligence law was in a rapid period of transition. Ibid. Smyth notes that this accords with American studies which found that constitutional cases in the United States accounted for the highest rate of secondary citations. Smyth accounts for this on the basis of the difficult interpretation issues in constitutional cases and also the predominance of constitutional cases in the caseload of the court.
62
Searches of the database CASEBASE were utilised to gather this information for each case studied.
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Federal Law Review Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ whether the case was about a novel, difficult or unresolved legal issue directly related to one of the elements of negligence, whether it was reported in the authorised reports (CLR), how many High Court judges sat on the case, how frequently in the five years following the case it had been cited and applied in other negligence cases, and how frequently in the five years following the case it had been discussed in journal articles. 63 The more criteria the case satisfied, the more likely it was to be coded as high significance. For example, a case that was only reported in the ALR, only tangentially related to an element of negligence, involved only three judges, and had not been cited frequently in cases or articles was coded as low significance. 64 Cases which were about a critical aspect of an element of negligence, involved the full court, were lengthy involving multiple judgments, were reported in the CLR, and were cited frequently in cases or articles were coded as high significance. 65 Each case was coded for the number of overall judgments in a case. Each SF in every judgment was recorded and entered into an ACCESS database. Each recorded SF as far as possible dealt with a single subject matter. 66 SF in a judgment which were derived from quotes or reasoning from a lower court judgment or other case, expert witness testimony or counsel's submissions, were only entered into the database as a SF where the relevant High Court judge explicitly adopted or accepted the statement in support of judicial reasoning as part of their determination of the case. SF which occurred when a judge was simply restating a summary of the facts or lower court findings or the parties' arguments or submissions were not included. Each individual SF 67 in a judgment was coded for the judge or judges who made it, whether it was referenced 68 and if so what kind of reference, whether it was in a single or joint judgment, and whether it was in a dissent 69 or majority judgment. 70 _____________________________________________________________________________________ 63 This form of qualitative coding has an inherent subjective element, as do other forms of interpretative qualitative (and even quantitative) empirical research. For this reason, the significance coding of cases is indicated in Appendix 1 so that coding choices are clearly apparent to other researchers. Where more than one SF about the same subject matter occurred in a single numbered paragraph of a judgment, they were coded as a single SF record. However, where a SF about the same subject matter occurred in a subsequent numbered paragraph, it was coded as a new SF record. 67 The general definition of SF discussed in the introduction to this article was used to identify SF. More detailed coding instructions in relation to the application of the definition of SF are held on file with the author.
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A SF was recorded as referenced when a footnote reference was provided for at least part of the statement (even if not for all of the statement) or when it was made clear in the text of the SF that it was sourced to some other source such as an expert witness, counsel's brief or an intervener. If a judge only explicitly cited their own previous judgment in a case, that was not counted as a reference. 69 There is a methodological debate about how to categorise High Court judgments, as either majority or dissenting judgments, for the purpose of dissent studies. See, eg, Lynch, 'Dissent: Towards a Methodology for Measuring Judicial Disagreement in the High Court of Australia', above n 44. This study adopted the simple method of categorising a judgment as a majority judgment if it concurred with the majority on the overall resolution of the appeal, either allowing or dismissing the appeal on the orders. A judgment was coded as a majority judgment if it concurred with the majority on the overall resolution of the appeal, Much of the scholarship regarding tort law and negligence law focuses on the permissibility (and impermissibility) of the use of 'policy' or consequence based arguments in negligence cases. 75 However, the study confirmed that SF played a much broader role in judicial reasoning. While there were examples of High Court judges referring to policy or consequence concerns (see the three SF examples above) judges did not only use SF as part of 'policy' or consequence based reasoning.
Judges used SF in their judicial reasons in a range of other ways including to measure or evaluate adjudicative facts ('social framework') 76 and as part of the creation of general background or context to a decision. 'Social framework' SF were used to identify whether particular elements of negligence were satisfied on the facts of the case (for example the nature or severity of a particular risk, whether a particular risk was foreseeable, whether appropriate precautions were taken by a defendant or whether a breach of duty had occurred). Examples of 'social framework' SF identified in the study included:
They have a loving relationship with a healthy child. It does not involve any special financial or other responsibilities that might exist if, for example, the child had an unusual and financially burdensome need for care. The financial obligations which the respondents have incurred, legal and moral, are of the same order as those involved in any ordinary parent-child relationship. 77 In a social, as in a commercial, context, the risk of injury associated with the consumption of alcohol is not limited to cases where there is an advanced state of intoxication. The study also identified SF that were used more generally (rather then specifically) to frame judicial assessment of the circumstances pertaining to a case, were used by judges to provide a context or general background to judicial reasons, or formed part of general judicial rhetorical reasoning. For example, in NSW v Bujdoso the unanimous High Court commented that '[m]any of the people in prisons are there precisely because they present a danger, often a physical danger to the community', and noted the propensity of prisoners to do 'grave physical injury to other prisoners'. 80 It was acknowledged as 'notorious' that those convicted of sexual offences against minors are at greater risk of harm. 81 In Cole v South Tweed Heads Rugby League Football Club judges discussed the management practices of publicans and the nature of publican and customer relationships. 82 In a range of cases judges discussed the work practices of police, how police act in investigations, how police resources are deployed, and the nature of police intelligence gathering. 83 In several cases judges discussed the nature of commercial building and commercial development of premises and land. 84 Judges in Neindorf v Junkovic discussed the nature of residences of 'ordinary people', how they maintain those premises, the frequency of defects in ordinary people's houses, and the nature of hazards in ordinary houses. 85 In the same case, garage sales were described as a 'familiar event in Australian suburbia'. 86 In NSW v Lepore members of the court commented on the nature of school children, the nature of teaching, practices school authorities could adopt to prevent child sexual assault, and the prevalence of sexual assault. 87 In a case that concerned physical injuries which occurred in a school playground, judges commented on a range of factors, including the nature of school students and the nature and costs of playground supervision. 88 These findings confirmed that SF are not just used by judges of the High Court as part of traditional 'policy' or consequence based reasoning. SF play a much broader range of roles in High Court cases. They may be used by a judge to evaluate an adjudicative fact. They might also be used as part of building a general factual background to a matter, or as part of judicial rhetoric.
III HOW OFTEN DID JUDGES USE SF?
As seen in Table 1 The tendency of judges to use SF in their judicial reasoning in the negligence cases studied did not appear to outweigh their tendency to refer to traditional sources of legal reasoning such as legal principles and adjudicative facts. As Table 1 shows, the majority of text in negligence decisions studied was made up of statements that were not SF-statements that were legal principles, adjudicative facts and statements which were in the nature of 'legal' values. 89 This may give comfort to those who favour a more positivist or formalist version of judicial decision-making which rests on For example, matters of coherence and consistency.
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Federal Law Review
Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ application of legal principles and legal values to adjudicative facts. However, of course, frequency counts of SF do not tell the whole story. It may be that even though a case contains a small number of SF, those SF may be highly influential in the ultimate determination of a case. 90 In addition, judicial use of SF in the cases studied was not uniform. There were clusters of cases where SF were far more frequently used by judges, and clusters of cases where SF were used very little. This adds an extra level of complexity to how we understand judicial use of SF, and the role of SF in judicial reasoning. In some categories of cases it appears that even if frequency counts of SF are considered in the abstract, SF have a quite important role to play in judicial reasoning. In other categories of cases SF may have little or no role to play.
IV DID THE SIGNIFICANCE OF CASES AFFECT THE FREQUENCY OF SF?
In some cases SF played a more important role in judicial reasoning. A number of interrelated factors appeared to affect how frequently SF were used in a particular case. Future research utilising different methods would be required to determine this. This may also be an area of strength for more traditional doctrinal legal research. 91 As discussed above, cases were coded as high significance, medium significance or low significance. There were 16 high significance cases, 21 medium significance cases and eight low significance cases. The total number of judicial SF for each case was extracted from the overall SF database. 
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Ltd 99 (determination of whether expert witness withdrew opinion and effect of this) with one SF, Willett v Futcher 100 (assessment of damages, investment advice fees) with one SF and Amaca Pty Ltd v State of New South Wales 101 (contribution, powers of court of appeal) with one SF.
As Graph 2 demonstrates, high significance cases were clearly the 'type' of case where judges were likely to refer to SF as a significant part of their judicial reasoning. 102 Large differences can be seen between the average use of SF by judges in high significance cases and average judicial use of SF in low and medium significance cases. High significance cases had on average 56.25 SF/case, with medium significance cases having only 12.9 SF/case and low significance cases 4.63/case. 
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In addition, when the overall group of SF identified in the study were considered, a large majority of all SF came from high significance cases. Nine hundred SF (74.5% of all SF) came from high significance cases, with 271 (22.4%) from medium significance cases and only 37 (3.1%) from low significance cases.
The number of judgments in a case was also related to the overall number of SF identified in a case. Cases with a larger number of judgments tended to have a larger number of SF. The number of judgments was also typically related to the overall significance or complexity of a case. 103 The study found that the larger the number of judgments in a case, the larger the number of average SF in the case. As Graph 3 shows, six judgment cases had an average of 59.8 SF/case, five judgment cases an average of 43.22 SF/case, four judgment cases an average of 36.5 SF/case, three judgment cases an average of 13.88 SF/case, two judgment cases an average of 4.8 SF/case and one judgment cases an average of 2.38 SF/case.
Graph 3: Average Number of SF/Case and Number of Judgments in the Case
It is not surprising that cases with a larger number of judgments might have larger total numbers of SF-the more judgments there are in a case, the more opportunity _____________________________________________________________________________________ 103 See Appendix 2.
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there is for judges to refer to SF. However, this study also found that higher numbers of judgments in a case was related to higher average numbers of SF/judgment. The more judges sat on a case, the more each judge in that case tended to use SF in their judicial reasons. Six judgment cases had an average of 9.9 SF/judgment, five judgment cases had an average of 8.64 SF/judgment, four judgment cases had an average of 9.13 SF/judgment, three judgment cases had an average of 4.63 SF/judgment, two judgment cases had an average of 2.4 SF/judgment and one judgment cases had an average of 2.38 SF/judgment.
V SOURCES OF SF
One of the key aspects of the Australian adversarial litigation system is the principle that judicial reasoning should be based on admissible (relevant and reliable) evidence and legal precedent. These principles lie at the very heart of Australian evidence law and practice. 104 Judges are not 'participants' in the litigation, and generally are not 'permitted to go outside the evidence present and to act upon information privately obtained'. 105 It might initially be expected, given the uncertainties in relation to the doctrine of judicial notice and its legislative equivalents discussed in the introduction to this article, that where judges use SF in their judgments those SF would be sourced from admissible evidence. Where SF are 'empirical' in nature (that is, they concern social, behavioural or scientific phenomena which have been empirically studied or are capable of empirical study) it might be expected that judges would refer to reliable empirical sources introduced in evidence or proved via expert witnesses. However, as this section shows, the content analysis conducted in this study found that judges most commonly did not refer to a source for SF in their judgments. Where judges referred to a source for a SF, it was typically to a 'legal' source such as another case. Judicial reference to empirical material was very rare. Table 4 shows that only 26% of all SF used by judges were referenced or sourced. This means that 74% of all SF used by judges were not sourced or referenced in any way. 
334
Federal Law Review
Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ submissions, expert witness testimony or the judge's own research. It is impossible to come to any conclusion about this from examining only the reasons for judgment using a content analysis method. 107 However, it appears that most SF which were not sourced or referenced were drawn from judges' own general knowledge or intuition. They were ostensibly based on judicial conceptions of 'common sense' or 'common knowledge'. Despite statements from a number of judges in the cases studied of the dangers of judges using 'common sense' or 'common understanding' assumptions, 108 judges explicitly used many terms which signalled judicial assumptions of common sense, 'common understandings', or common knowledge. These included:
It is notorious that… 109 Experience tells… 110 Many citizens believe… 111 But few would contend that… 112 It may be readily accepted that... 113 It is common to speak of… 114 They are a well-known and natural phenomenon… 115 _____________________________________________________________________________________ 107 An investigation of how judges implicitly use SF material is an area for further research.
This question would need to be investigated using different research methods, for example judicial interviews and surveys, or by using a different form of content analysis to investigate how SF in counsel's submission (oral and written) or expert evidence are reflected in judicial reasoning. 
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A garage sale is a familiar event in Australian suburbia. (italics added) 116 Examination will usually reveal that... 117 It is well understood that… 118 …explains the increasing awareness, both in the medical profession and in the community generally… 119 Observation confirms that, in this community, it is accepted… 120 …as is common knowledge… 121 In the ordinary course… 122 Sometimes (perhaps often) the use of judicial intuition or judicial common sense as the basis for SF is uncontroversial and may contribute to efficient judicial reasoning. 123 For example, 'a supply of pure water is a feature of Australian domestic life. Living in houses connected to a water supply is not unusual in Australia' 124 is hardly likely to be contentious. However, there are also particular dangers that can arise from judicial use of 'common sense' or 'common knowledge', which impact on the accuracy of judicial 
Federal Law Review
Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ reasons and restrict the inclusion of the perspectives of marginalised groups 125 and less dominant cultural worldviews 126 in judicial reasoning. 127 These dangers include judicial extrapolations of a judge's own personal unrepresentative 'private' knowledge as equivalent to the general knowledge of the community, failure to refer to or appreciate the life experiences of particular groups in the community (for example women, people with a disability, people of non Anglo-Saxon racial backgrounds, and lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender people) and the use of SF which are inconsistent with available empirical research.
The content analysis study found that only 26% of judicial SF referred to a source or reference in some way. There were 351 SF reference categories 128 recorded for the 315 referenced or sourced SF. Some SF were referenced or sourced by judges to more than one kind of reference or source, resulting in a higher number of categories recorded than referenced SF. 129 As demonstrated in Chart 5, the source for SF most frequently referred to by judges were cases (57% of all category entries). The second most common source referred to was 'other source' (21.4% of all category entries). Most references in this category were to legal sources such as legislation, expert evidence or general evidence, and counsel's submissions. There were also some references to law reform commission reports, other government reports and international instruments and covenants. The third most common category of source for SF was secondary 130 (17.66% of all category records). The least common form of reference was empirical sources with only 14 SF (out of 1208 SF in total) citing an empirical source or reference (only 4% of all SF category entries, and 1.16% of all SF).
Chart 5: Types of SF References
Traditional legal sources, such as reported cases, legislation and expert evidence, dominated the sources used by the judges for SF. However, 'legal' sources can be poor quality sources of SF information. The use of existing cases tends to simply reproduce judicial 'common sense' from one case to the next with the potential errors this brings. There is some evidence in the data from the content analysis that occasionally this problem might be circumvented when the cases referred to by a judge to support a SF themselves considered empirical or expert evidence related to the SF. This appears to have occurred in respect of a number of SF identified in the content analysis which concerned the reliability of assessments of witness credibility. 131 However, this raises the further problem of potential judicial reliance on empirical findings (via an existing _____________________________________________________________________________________ 130 These books and articles were predominantly legal books and articles. Books or articles which were published empirical studies were counted in the empirical evidence category. 131 
Federal Law Review
Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ precedent) which are old and outdated. 132 There was evidence that in a number of cases High Court judges drew on expert witness testimony or evidence given during the case as the basis for their SF statements. 133 This judicial use of expert witness statements and testimony shows the potential of expert reports and testimony to introduce reliable SF information to the High Court. Despite some judicial reference to this kind of evidence in a number of cases it was not a widespread source for judicial SF. In any event, there is research suggesting that even when material is introduced via expert witness there is no guarantee this will result in 'quality' SF. 134 There were only fourteen instances where a judge provided some kind of direct empirical source for a SF. 135 139 or reports prepared by another government body. 140 The empirical sources used by High Court judges identified in this study were also not necessarily comprehensive or necessarily up to date. The ease of availability of the empirical material to judges (for example, via counsel's submissions or as part of material filed by a party or judicial research), or existing familiarity with the empirical material seem to have been more likely influences on the judicial choice of empirical material than an assessment of whether the material was contemporary, comprehensive, valid and reliable.
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VI DOES THE FREQUENCY AND SOURCE OF SF DIFFER BETWEEN JUDGES?
There were commonalities in the way the individual High Court judges examined in this study referred to and sourced SF. For example, all judges referred to legal principles and adjudicative facts much more than SF in their judicial reasoning, all judges predominantly gave no sources for SF, and where sources were given they were mostly to legal sources such as case law. But despite these commonalities the judges of the High Court are not a homogeneous group. In the same way that judges have different judicial philosophies, 141 so different judges varied in how frequently they used and sourced SF in their judicial reasoning. Table 6 demonstrates that there were some variations in how frequently the judges studied utilised SF in their judgments. The frequency of use of SF in judgments ranged from the 9.27 SF/judgment for Kirby J to 4.92 SF/judgment for Gummow J and 4.8SF/judgment for Gaudron J. This suggests that there were differing propensities of individual judges in relation to the use of SF in judicial reasoning. application of ordinary legal principles is to be denied on the basis of public policy, it is essential that such policy be spelt out so as to be susceptible of analysis and criticism. Desirably it should be founded on empirical evidence, not mere judicial assertions'.
Federal Law Review
Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ than case law were Heydon J and Callinan J, who have both indicated some antipathy towards such sources of judicial reasoning. 151 
VII SF AND GROUP EFFECTS: JOINT JUDGMENTS, SINGLE JUDGMENTS, MAJORITY JUDGMENTS AND DISSENTING JUDGMENTS
Martinek has recently argued that group dynamics can impact on how judges use nonlegal factors in their decision-making, with membership in the small group of 'the court', with its shared cultural and legal norms, potentially driving more reliance on 'legal' factors than non-legal factors. 152 This part shows that there were apparent 'group' effects in the results of the content analysis. Judges used SF more in single judgments than joint judgments, and more in dissenting judgments than majority judgments. When these factors were combined (for example single dissenting judgment) there were even greater effects on judicial use of SF. There were differences in the frequency of the use of SF by judges dependent on whether they wrote a judgment as an individual or whether they wrote a judgment with other judges as part of a joint judgment. This difference can be seen below in Graph 7. The frequency of SF in single judge judgments (8.54 SF/judgment) was much higher than the frequency of SF in joint judgments (5.53 SF/judgment). Judges in joint judgments tended to use SF less (and presumably rely more on legal principles and adjudicative facts as a basis for judgment). These results appear to support the argument made by Martinek that grouping of judges tends to result in more reliance on legal rather than non-legal factors in judgments.
Care needs to be taken when considering the ramifications of the 'group' effect seen in these results for wider understanding of High Court judicial decision-making. Many of the single judgments in this study were by Justices Kirby, McHugh and Gleeson. As noted above, these judges were among the highest users of SF/judgment. What appears to be an effect related to the difference in judicial use of SF between single and group judgments could instead reflect wholly or partially individual characteristics of these particular judges. In addition, the results of this content analysis are confined to 45 negligence cases over a defined time period (2001) (2002) (2003) (2004) (2005) . There are possible differences that could be seen over other time periods, and as a result of different compositions and leadership of the High Court which might result in different group ____________________________________________________________________________________ dynamics and differences in court cohesion. 153 However, the results certainly do raise interesting possibilities about how group dynamics affect judicial reasoning more generally. 154
Graph 7: Joint Judgments, Single Judgments and SF The other factor that had a significant effect on judicial use of SF identified in this study was whether a judge was part of the majority decision in a case, or was writing a dissenting judgment. Most SF occurred in majority judgments with 800 SF in 122 majority judgments. This is unsurprising because there are many more majority judgments (122) overall than dissenting judgments (36) in the cases studied. However, SF were far more frequent on a per judgment basis in dissenting judgments (11.33 SF/judgment) than in majority judgments (6.56 SF/judgment). Judges writing dissents used SF much more frequently than judges writing majority judgments.
Justice Kirby has argued that judicial dissent plays an important role in appellate judicial decision-making and encourages judicial honesty and transparency. 155 It 
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Volume 40 ____________________________________________________________________________________ appears from the results of this analysis that judges in dissenting judgments may indeed be more 'transparent' in their use of SF. Again, for similar reasons to those discussed above, care needs to be taken in extrapolating the effects of dissent shown in this study to the use of SF by the High Court generally. However, again the results show a fertile ground for research which compares the differences in the nature of judicial reasoning and judicial use of SF in majority and dissenting judgments. The factors of 'single' judgment and 'dissenting judgment' also appeared to have a combined effect. Most SF identified in the study were from single majority judgments (584 SF). However, the highest rate of SF/judgment occurred in single dissenting judgments (11.74 SF/judgment) and the lowest rate of SF/judgment in majority joint judgments (5.14 SF/judgment). As can be seen in Graph 8, even where a judgment was joint rather than single, the fact that it was dissenting still resulted in a large number of SF/judgment (8.8 SF/judgment). This is a much higher number of SF/judgment than in single majority judgments (7.3 SF/judgments).
CONCLUSION
It is clear that judges do use SF in their judicial reasoning in the High Court of Australia. The content analysis study discussed in this article confirmed that SF do form a part of the judicial reasoning 'tool box' in the High Court of Australia. SF play a range of roles in judicial reasoning including to set context and background, as social framework, and as part of policy statements. SF are not only used as part of consequence-based reasoning. Sometimes SF were referred to relatively infrequently in judicial reasoning, and much of the text of judicial reasoning is made up of the application of legal principles and rules to the adjudicative facts of the case. Of course, even where SF are used infrequently they may still exert considerable influence on a court's ultimate decision. The study also suggests, however, that in the most important and complex High Court cases SF are referred to frequently and can potentially play a very significant role in how judges craft their reasoning. The study also found that there were a number of factors that appeared to impact on how judges used SF in their reasoning, including how many judgments there were in a case, whether a judgment was a single or joint judgment, and whether a judgment was dissenting or majority. In addition, while there were significant commonalities in the way High Court judges used SF, there were also some differences, including frequency of use of SF and use of sources for SF. The study also found that judges most often did not source their SF. Where sources were used they were likely to be more traditional legal sources which were not always likely to be high quality sources of SF information. Judicial intuition and 'common sense' were the main sources of judicial SF statements, with the potential dangers this sometimes brings to judicial accuracy and legitimacy.
